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Abstract: 
The article describes the manner in which in companies make decisions about 
dismissals. It begins with the presentation of a number of theories, which attempt to 
depict the complexity of the employment relationship. This is followed by the 
presentation of the legal framework and the various options for action at the 
respective levels. The third section draws together empirical data that illuminates the 
relevance of the various steps involved in the termination of the employment 
relationship. It shows that the prevalent assumptions that companies hold regarding 
the effects of the KSchG are unfounded.  
Key words: Employment Protection Legislation, Dismissal, Severance Payment. 
 
The German version of this text is published in: DGB-Rechtsschutz GmbH, 2008, 
„Die Sicherung von Arbeitnehmerrechten – 10 Jahre DGB Rechtsschutz GmbH”, 
Nomos-Verlag, Baden-Baden (forthcoming).  
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1. Introduction 
The focus of discussions on labour market politics moves again and again to 
dismissal protection, which, as an element of labour market regulation, is attributed 
partial responsibility for stagnating labour market development. Carried further, a 
relationship is assumed between the rigidity of dismissal protection and the 
employment trend, which is largely based on implicit assumptions about company 
behaviour. Above all, it is assumed that German dismissal protection makes 
dismissal more expensive and consequently deters companies from necessary new 
appointments. These theses have found their way into German labour market 
research without the assumed interrelationship being thematised in any way. Rather, 
the company is usually perceived as a black box, so that the internal company 
decision-making processes and motivation involved in personnel planning remains 
unconsidered (cf. on this subject, e.g. the articles by Jahn/Schnabel 2003; 
Jahn/Walwei 2003; Jerger 2003; Jahn 2004). In fact, aside from partial investigations 
conducted by human resources management, there has been no representative 
empirical research into how companies implement labour legislation since the Max-
Planck Institute study of 19811, and consequently there are few substantiated 
findings about current company employment and dismissal practices.  
This paper follows twin goals. On the one hand, it intends to show the spectrum of 
possible company behaviour while considering the theoretical principles of human 
resources management and in doing so identify complimentary or conflicting factors 
in the explanation of hiring and dismissal decisions. On the other hand, an empirical 
analysis of dismissal processes will illustrate the effect of labour law in company 
practice and so question the purely benefit-oriented “cause and effect” schema. This 
makes it clear that company practice is determined by a multitude of sometimes 
complexly interwoven factors among which labour law plays only a marginal role. 
The structure corresponds to these two research goals. The first section discusses 
existing empirical findings and theoretical perspectives, identifies alternative options 
for action and relates these to the termination process. In the second section, 
 
1  This research was commissioned by the Federal Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs and had the goal 
of researching dismissal protection and practice. Five sub-surveys were conducted: a representative, written 
survey of companies per post (612 companies were questioned about the general process of termination and 
a further 804 companies were asked about their last case of termination), a representative, written survey of 
works councils per post (740 cases), a representative, verbal survey (879 persons), plus an analysis of labour 
court files, including questioning Judges and legal representatives and an analysis of collective labour 
agreements. The questioning of judges and DGB legal protection secretaries was conducted as a complete, 
written survey by post (The rate of return lay at around 50 % in each case), a random sample was selected for 
the questioning of owners and lawyers (Falke et al. 1981). 
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company practice provides the basis for demonstrating the extent to which employer-
initiated termination competes with other instruments during personnel adjustments, 
and how dismissal is carried out in business. The article is limited to an explorative 
approach and concentrates primarily on a descriptive presentation of findings. This 
approach permits a comprehensive presentation of findings from the only current 
representative survey on this subject: the WSI Survey on the Termination of 
Employment Relationships (2001) and the WSI Survey on Company Personnel 
Policies (2003). Where it makes sense or appears to be necessary, the findings are 
supplemented by analyses from the IAB Betriebspanel (Institute of Employment 
Research) and the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). Data is also drawn from the 
KÜPRAX Project. This project analysed dismissal disputes that were brought before 
the Labour Courts in 2003 (Höland et al. 2007). This means that all currently 
available data sources on this subject are used. 
2. Engagements and dismissals in the shadow of the legislative regulation of 
employment – theoretical considerations 
2.1 The limits of macro-economic analyses 
As an element of the institutional labour market conditions, dismissal protection has 
occupied a central position in employment policy discussions since the OECD Job 
Study of 1994 (OECD 1994). The question of the effect of dismissal protection on the 
level, duration and structure of unemployment has given rise to a multitude of 
macroeconomic studies. However, it has not been possible to prove an identifiable 
and unequivocally positive relationship between the rigidity of dismissal protection 
and the rate of unemployment, though an effect on the dynamic of labour market 
processes – and therefore on the duration of long-term unemployment suggests: “All 
time spent in anxiously complaining about the rigidity of labour market regulation, 
employment protection and minimum wages is probably wasted“ (Nickell/Layard 
1999: 3080; cf. the discussion on this subject in Truger/Hein 2003 and the overview 
in OECD 2004: 82). There is also doubt that employment protection has a clear effect 
on the development of productivity. In fact, regulation of the product market rather 
than of the employment market has been made responsible for slowing down 
productivity (Nicoletti and Scarpetta 2003), and the lack of long-term investment in 
the future, for example in training, for ongoing high unemployment (Aiginger 2004). In 
contrast, one suspects a positive relationship between employment protection and 
long-term unemployment (Elmeskov, Martin, and Scarpetta 1998), and a negative 
relationship between employment protection and production growth in those 
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countries where the wage parties negotiate their wages in neither a coordinated nor a 
completely decentralised manner (Scarpetta und Tressel 2004). The latter does not 
apply to Germany however, since wage negotiations are largely coordinated. 
International comparative macroeconomic studies are afflicted by two methodological 
problems. Firstly, the development of indicators demands objectifying and reducing 
the complexity of labour law. The conventional EPL indicators (Employment 
Protection Legislation indicators, cf. Nicoletti, Scarpetta and Boylaud 1999: 40 ff.) 
mostly only consider the legal situation related to the regulation of employment 
relationships. The “cost of dismissals” or the “rigidity“ of employment protection is 
therefore not measured on the basis of empirical findings on the actual application of 
the legal conditions, but solely on the basis of selected formal legal regulations. 
Provisions that regulate application, which are highly relevant for the practice, such 
as, e.g. the duration of the term in which legal action can be filed and the openness 
of many regulations to change by collective labour agreement, are largely excluded 
from the analyses or cannot be compared due to the depth of their practice-related 
differences. For example, Denmark is often cited as a country without legislative 
dismissal protection. What is not taken into consideration is that here, dismissal 
protection is frequently regulated by collective labour agreements, which 
demonstrate a very high level of coverage. Since the individual steps in establishing 
the factors are not provided, it also remains unclear how, e.g. the cost of 
compensation for dismissal is evaluated, which German legislation anticipates only 
under exceptional circumstances but which is nevertheless often a result of 
negotiations between employers and employees. Consequently, the complexity of 
the various dismissal protection regulations and their application is usually only made 
clear in comparative legal studies (cf. on the subject, Zachert, 2004). In addition, the 
correct and immediate application of the formal regulations is assumed. 
Secondly, comparative studies are revealed to be methodologically problematic to 
the extent that the real costs of the regulations have been far from completely 
documented. Namely, the data increasingly includes the regulation of functional 
equivalents (fixed term and personnel leasing). Sometimes the interconnection 
between labour law and social security systems is also included (OECD 2004: 91). 
Possible long-term costs for the company resulting from the specialist workers’ lack 
of commitment to the company and from the loss of these workers also remain 
unconsidered, particularly as they are difficult to measure and quantify. Generally 
considered, these country comparisons underestimate the complexity of the social 
and economic systems in which the regulations for dismissal protection are 
embedded (for a revised perspective cf. OECD 2004: 64). Analytical perspectives 
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whose theoretical and empirical focus is on the actions of the actors within 
companies appear to be more promising in their capacity to explain the effect of 
labour law regulations on company behaviour.  
2.2 Company behaviour from the micro-analytical perspective 
Labour market institutions as limitation and support to entrepreneurial action. 
In macroeconomics, especially transaction cost theory (Williamson 1985) offers an 
approach to explaining company decisions. In contrast to the simple neoclassical 
contract model, in which contracts are negotiated through the free interaction of 
(market) forces, transaction cost theory assumes that the organisation and realisation 
of company actions (transactions) gives rise to costs, the scope of which are largely 
determined by the conditions of the institutional framework and which are not 
compensated for earnings: Hiring suitable employees entails information and search 
costs and possibly qualification costs; the employees’ performance must be 
monitored and, where necessary, motivated through incentives or disciplinary action, 
and employee dismissal must also be planned and realised. Consequently, the costs 
incurred through dismissal, in the form of severance payments, legal action against 
unfair dismissal or backwages, are considered typical “ex-post” transaction costs. In 
this respect employment protection legislation can increase costs and therefore, it is 
not surprising that employers perceive labour market regulation as a constraint and 
limitation of their entrepreneurial action. However, institutional regulations can also 
improve the transactions in that they set transparent and binding rules and minimise 
variance in behaviour through routines and practices and consequently reduce the 
associated costs. 
Because the conditions for employer-initiated dismissal are specified in the 
Employment Protection Act, it offers a binding legal basis that reduces the insecurity 
of both contractual partners in respect to their respective performance and 
obligations, and as such reduces the potential for conflict. For the German 
employment system, a typical “side effect” of the relative security of employment 
associated with the legislative regulation of labour is the willingness of employees to 
acquire company-specific qualifications and to remain in the company long term. 
Thus, labour law does not only act as a constraint, but also in ways as a support for 
companies. 
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The nature of the employment relationship and economic pressures as the 
most important determinants of personnel decisions.  
The way in which is dismissal protection is practiced in companies and the extent to 
which it is actually a cost factor depends not only on the individual appraisal of labour 
legislation and the anticipation of possible sanctions. In fact, two additional factors 
play an important role: The relationship between the employer and employee within 
the firm and the existence of pressure to comply, i.e. the company’s perception of 
this pressure. 
The relationship between employer and employees can be marked by a purely 
functional and rather short-term calculation or through a long-term and tendentially 
cooperative and social personnel policy and culture. From the perspective of 
transaction cost theory, the employment relationship is considered a “relational” 
contract, which is characterised by the fundamental openness and long-term nature 
of the contractual relationship. Work performance cannot be agreed to in fine detail 
or for an extended duration in the employment contract so that the employment 
contract is a social relationship embedded in a complex social context (Ebers/Gotsch 
2002: 231). The actual fulfilment of the contract (the assurance of employment and 
payment wages in exchange for the employee’s performance of tasks) cannot be 
automatically taken from the formal legal framework. Rather it is determined by a 
series of complex factors such as motivation, mutual trust, company promotion and 
the company culture (for elaboration, cf. Sadowski 1986). The same phenomenon is 
discussed in the legal literature under the heading “incomplete contract”. Further, the 
institutional economics perspective, to which transaction cost theory belongs, 
recognises that the parties to the contract (can) act rationally only to a limited extent 
because the amount of available and processed information is inevitably limited and 
therefore decisions are always made under a greater or lesser degree of uncertainty. 
For example, companies can only estimate their personnel requirements when hiring 
or dismissing staff; they cannot determine their prospective requirements exactly. 
Because personnel requirements can change, the Employment Protection Act 
(KSchG) makes provision for dismissal on urgent operational grounds. Of course, 
companies must not necessarily be informed about the legal conditions in order to 
engage in hiring or dismissals. 
As long as no conflict results, the lack of information about labour law is hardly 
noticed so that the companies evaluate their level of information as satisfactory in 
spite of their lack of knowledge. In this case, labour law has no relevance to company 
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actions, whereby both generous paternalistic and also short-term profit-maximising 
behaviour are by all means compatible with transaction cost theory assumptions. A 
further behavioural assumption of transaction cost theory is interesting in terms of 
explaining the behaviour of the various parties in the company. According to this, the 
contract partners are opportunistic or even sly and may act contrary to their 
knowledge of the law (Ebers/Gotsch 2002: 226). So it is theoretically plausible that 
the company provides its employees with false information, threatens them or 
attempts to prevent them from forming a works council. Conversely, the parties may 
choose a cooperative strategy and participation by employee representatives if they 
expect that this will result in a reduced amount of (expensive) conflict, better 
information or the conclusion of linked agreements. In any case, the respect and the 
departure from formal regulations can be consciously calculated: An unsystematic 
approach and the acceptance of legal disputes can be just as economically 
worthwhile as the long-term design and planning of the Personnel Department. On 
the employee side, the reaction to termination is also unforeseeable since the 
employees possess quite different levels of knowledge and expectations in terms of 
asserting their rights. Above all, they have an interest – although of varying intensity 
– in the maintenance of the employment relationship, which is dependent on their 
social security, their individual reemployment chances and their life situation. The 
assumption that an unjust dismissal is automatically followed by legal action is 
therefore unrealistic. In all cases, the behaviour on both sides is also influenced by 
other institutions, such as the form of unemployment insurance or the existence of 
early retirement regulations, which reduce the conflict potential of dismissals. The 
behavioural science organisation theory, which is more closely concerned with 
behavioural assumptions and conceptualises companies as the expression of a 
multitude of operational behaviours, drives the unforeseeability of business decisions 
to the extreme with the assistance of the “garbage can“ model (cf. the collected 
essays of March 1990). According to this perspective, the solution to problems, e.g. 
personnel decisions, can occur ad hoc and by chance, whereby the parties involved 
tend to oriente themselves on interpretation patterns (organisation culture) that are 
socially and culturally influenced, and widely accepted (Berger/Bernhard-Mehlich 
2002: 159). Thus, a broad spectrum of company behaviours can be explained by 
transaction cost theory and behavioural science.  
A second complex of factors, in our estimation, is the extent to which the reduction of 
personnel is viewed as a necessary and unavoidable solution. From the perspective 
of the business economics situational approach, the perception of problems is 
considered to be partly determined by other areas of action (e.g. goods and product 
markets) in the environment. Central to this approach is the assumption that formal 
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organisational structures have a strong influence on the efficiency of organisations, 
but that, on the other hand, there are no universally efficient organisational 
structures. In order to act efficiently, organisations must adjust their structures to the 
respective situations (Kieser 2002: 169). Consequently, labour law provisions are in 
no way uniformly implemented. Rather, the implementation is influenced by each 
company’s respective reality, which in practice is confronted with the law. Of 
particular influence here is the company’s size and branch, and the associated 
respective specific structural characteristics on the one hand, and its culture and 
traditions on the other.  
The interpretation of the situation under labour law is correspondingly diverse. 
Because companies are not obligated to conduct personnel planning, internal 
decision-making takes place within the framework of more or less developed 
structures. Consequently, in this perspective the adoption and diffusion of labour law 
are also considered processes of organisational learning (on the problem of 
organisational learning, cf. the contributions in March 1990). 
Here, changes to labour legislation are picked up and implemented with varying 
rapidity depending on the parties involved, their individual situations and the number 
of cases arising. This makes it possible to classify companies into various types 
according to their labour law culture. The spectrum ranges from an approach that is 
strictly guided by the regulations to an economic perspective in which the cost of 
complying with a regulation is weighed against contravention, through to the extreme 
case where labour law regulations are simply – consciously or unconsciously – 
ignored (Schramm/Zachert 2005). 
Application of the des Employment Protection Act in practice 
The structure of the formal legal framework leaves no room for the development of a 
political personnel strategy that would apply to all companies. Rather, it can be 
expected that a company’s economic personnel culture and the micro-economic 
demands a company experiences, i.e. their interpretation, influence personnel 
decisions. As such, labour law is a necessary but insufficient variable for the 
explanation of personnel-political actions.  
In summary, the theoretical considerations provide the basis for at least three 
hypotheses on the application of labour law and the generation of costs through the 
legislative regulation of labour:  
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1. The interpretation of the Employment Protection Act (KSchG) is relativised by 
competing problems in the company’s environment. Problems connected to the 
product or goods markets prove to be much costlier and therefore more 
important. The strategy of cost reduction through personnel reduction and the 
signalling effect of saving (personnel) costs appears to be gaining significance 
with the increasing importance of stock exchange results so that – independent 
of understandable changes – an increasing amount of pressure for adjustment is 
experienced.  
2. Transaction cost theory stresses the significance of information, i.e. of insecurity 
for operational action. In this respect, the Employment Protection Act (KSchG) 
must be considered not only a limitation but also a support that tends to 
standardise termination processes and make them transparent. In addition, 
because it protects the employees from arbitrary dismissal, it also increases 
motivation and consequently productivity, and provides an incentive for 
investment in company-specific training.  
3. The “rational” of cost-calculated action by the interest groups in a company 
presents only one type of possible reaction. At the same time (personnel) 
decisions are also made under the influence of cultural and social factors and 
routine procedures. From this perspective, it is also possible that the company 
completely ignores the provisions of labour law and orients itself on its peer 
group, i.e. on other companies. The provisions of labour law are then only of 
relevance when it came to problems and the company is confronted with the valid 
legal situation (possibly in court) in order to solve these problems.  
 
2.3 Analytical Framework: Stages of action in the adjustment of company 
personnel levels 
Three typically characteristic stages can be distinguished when analysing the role of 
labour law in reducing of employee numbers: The choice of strategic personnel 
policy, the application, i.e. how the provisions of dismissal protection are handled and 
the company implementation of termination (Figure 1). 
 13
Fig. 1: Stages of Action in Company Personnel Adjustment  
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In choosing the approach of the personnel policy, a decision is first made about the 
nature of dismissal of the affected employees (Stage 1). Here, the provisions for 
fixed-term and temporary workers are effectively “functional equivalents”, which – 
with appropriate planning – make it possible to avoid dismissal processes (cf. also 
Zachert 2004). A reduction in personnel can also be achieved by not reoccupying 
positions that become vacant or by making use of the provisions of social positions 
such as semi-retirement or the reduction of working hours to reduce the volume of 
work. In this way, conflicts associated with employer-initiated dismissal can be 
minimised in advance (1a). Either a dissolution agreement can be concluded with the 
affected person or the employer can directly or indirectly call upon the person to give 
notice (1b). For employees to terminate the employment contract themselves is – 
unless a seamless transition into new employment is found – unattractive for the 
employee, because the self-initiated termination of the employment relationship can 
 
 14
 
                                           
result in their eligibility for unemployment benefits being blocked for of up to 12 
weeks, which can consequently reduce their entitlements. According to a judgement 
of the Federal Social Court, a period of ineligibility can result not only from the 
conclusion of a dissolution agreement, but also from the conclusion of a so-called 
“Winding-up Agreement” in which the dismissed person enters into an agreement 
with the employer to accept the dismissal within the term in which legal action can be 
initiated through the Labour Court. Only when there are important grounds for 
concluding such a contract, does it fail to result in a period of ineligibility. If the 
dismissal is objectively justified on grounds that are not conduct related, this 
constitutes an important ground.2 However, should this compromise be concluded 
before the Labour Court, no period of ineligibility is imposed on principle (on this 
problem, cf. Kramer 2004). Consequently, this precedence reduces the employee’s 
willingness to sign such contracts and possibly increases the occurrence of legal 
action. Following the introduction of Section 1a of the Employment Protection Act 
(KSchG), according to which the employer can offer the employee compensation in 
the written notification of termination, to which the dismissed person may only lay 
claim if they refrain from pursuing legal action, the Federal Social Court deliberates to 
waive investigation of the legal validity of the dismissal if the amount paid as 
compensation does not exceed the level anticipated by Section 1a of the 
Employment Protection Act (KSchG), i.e. half of the monthly wage per year of 
employment.3 On the other hand, employees may prefer to terminate the 
employment contract themselves in order to avoid any possible disadvantages 
associated with dismissal during future job applications.  
Should a company decide to dismiss an employee, the legitimacy of the dismissal 
and of any possible special dismissal protection must be checked and the terms of 
notice must be observed (Stage 2). If the Employment Protection Act applies to the 
company, the management must provide grounds for the dismissal, which may relate 
to the employee’s person or conduct, or to urgent operational business requirements, 
in keeping with the act. Should dismissal be due to operational requirements, all 
employees who perform comparable tasks must be identified in order to carry out a 
so-called social selection. According to the most recent legislative amendments,4 
increased consideration can be given to operational requirements, especially 
 
2  Federal Social Court, Judgement of 12.07.2006, B 11a AL 47/05, published in: Neue Zeitschrift für 
Arbeitsrecht, Issue 23/2006, p.1359 
3 Federal Social Court, Judgement of 12.07.2006, B 11a AL 47/05, published in: Neue Zeitschrift für 
Arbeitsrecht, Issue 23/2006, p.1359 
4  Federal Law Gazette No. 67 of 30.12.2003, BGB. Part I 2003, No. 67, 30.12.2003, p. 3002. 
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differences in performance between employees. A further relaxation for the company 
is that in the event of a compensation agreement (“Interessenausgleich”) the 
employer can compile a list of names together with the works council, i.e. jointly 
select the employees to be dismissed. In this case the burden of proof is reversed: 
Normally the employer must provide evidence that the dismissal is due to operative 
requirements; however, in this case the dismissed employee must provide evidence 
that there was no urgent operational necessity for the termination. In addition, the 
selection of those to be dismissed can only be legally challenged if it is grossly 
erroneous. If an employee has been selected for dismissal, the dismissal must be 
issued in written form (Stage 3). In the case of dismissal, the works council only has 
a right to information, i.e. it has the right to be heard prior to the dismissal, to be 
informed about the person and the grounds for dismissal (3 a).5 Disregard for this 
obligation makes the dismissal ineffective. Should the works council disagree with 
the dismissal, and the employee decide to take legal action, he/she must continue to 
be employed by the company during the proceedings.6 The dismissed person can 
accept the dismissal independent of an objection by the works council, he/she can 
attempt to negotiate a dissolution agreement and/or a severance payment or 
threaten to take legal action (3b). The situation described above applies here; the 
negotiating position of the dismissed person is restricted in that the participation in 
one’s own dismissal leads to a partial loss of unemployment insurance benefits. The 
right to severance pay exists in only two cases. When other persons are 
simultaneously dismissed, this can result in the obligation to compile a social plan, 
which is usually accompanied by redundancy pay.7 The social plan must be 
negotiated by the management and the works council. If there is no works council, 
there is no obligation to produce a social plan. If proceedings are already pending 
before the Labour Court, the employee has a right to redundancy pay in the event 
that he/she is successful before the court but cannot be reasonably expected to 
 
5  In contrast, new engagements and the classification, reclassification and relocation of personnel requires 
consent, whereby this right is limited by the fact that the works council can only withhold consent for few, 
clearly defined reasons (Section 102 of the Works Council Constitution Act (BetrVG)). These grounds include, 
e.g. failure to duly advertise a position in the company, contravention of the law or company agreements and 
the violation of company regulations.  
6  Under certain circumstances, the claim of continued employment can also be successfully asserted without an 
appeal through the works council, e.g. if the dismissal is obviously illegal (cf. Federal Labour Court, Greater 
Senate (“großer Senat”) decision of 27.02.1985, Az.: GS 1/84, BAGE 48, 122-129). 
7  Social plans can only be concluded in companies with a works council and in which a specific percent of the 
employees are to be dismissed due to changes in the company (Section 112, 112a of the Works Council 
Constitution Act (BetrVG)). Social plan termination payments are therefore almost exclusively paid by large 
companies. Termination payments are negotiated for the complete social plan and not for those affected 
individually, cf. on this subject Fn. 28 
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continue the employment relationship.8 The newly introduced Section 1a of the 
Employment Protection Act (KSchG) recognises an “entitlement“ to compensation 
only when the employer indicates in the notice of dismissal that the dismissal is due 
to operational grounds and offers compensation on expiry of the term in which legal 
action can be filed. Sometimes reference is made to Section 1a of the Employment 
Protection Act (KSchG) as having introduced a “right to compensation” (Marczynski 
2004; Spieß 2004). However, a right as such is not provided by the regulation. It is an 
improvement to the extent that if this compensation is accepted, a period of 
ineligibility for unemployment benefits is not imposed. 
Where appropriate, the dismissed person can file a complaint with the Labour Court 
within a term of three weeks. In contrast to conditions in other European countries, 
this comparatively short deadline for lodging a complaint9 increases the company’s 
legal security. The court usually suggests a compromise with – or also without – 
compensation or ends the conflict with a decision (3c). Costs are incurred for legal 
representation in all cases before the Labour Court, given that legal representation is 
used.10 If the employer loses the case, the employment relationship is not ended by 
the dismissal so that the obligation to pay wages continues, even if the employee has 
been released from duty (backpay).11 If the dismissal was legally justified, then it is 
implemented as planned under observation of the term of notice. (3d). Ultimately, the 
conduct of both parties and the company culture decide the enforceability of 
employer-initiated dismissal.  
3. The three levels of action in company reality 
The events involved in terminations within the German employment system can be 
partly investigated through research by the Company Panel of the Institute for 
Employment Research (IAB Betriebspanel), which conducts an annual survey of 
15,000 companies of all size and from all branches. The survey is representative and 
 
8  Although the labour courts have a very narrow interpretation of the prerequisites for this provision (Section 9, 
Para. 1, Sentence 1 of the Employment Protection Act (KSchG)).  
9  Even in Great Britain, the term within which an appeal can be lodged against dismissal is three months. Only 
in Austria, where a regulation for severance pay applies, is this term shorter and amounts to only one week 
(Zachert 2004). 
10  Before the Labour Court – in contrast to ordinary courts – each party must carry the costs of their own lawyer, 
regardless of whether they win or lose (Section 12 a Labour Court Act (ArbGG)). 
11  By dismissal on urgent operational grounds, it is in the employer’s interests to release the dismissed worker 
from duty because the fact of their continued engagement makes it more difficult to prove that the position has 
become redundant. The company’s financial risk increases with the duration of the labour court proceedings. 
Companies that are well informed about labour law usually dismiss the employee again under other grounds 
during the proceedings in order to minimise the risk of having to pay backpay. 
 17
 
                                           
therefore reflects the structure of the 2.1 million companies in Germany. Analyses of 
the IAB Panels are used here, above all to test the reliability of our special surveys.12 
However, his data set contains very little information about specific termination 
procedures.  
The Institute for Economic and Social Research (WSI) at the Hans Böckler 
Foundation therefore conducted a survey of persons and a survey of companies in 
cooperation with Infratest, Munich, to investigate events associated with termination. 
The “WSI Survey on the Termination of Employment Relationships” provides, above 
all, person-related information about how the employment relationship was ended. 
This involved questioning 2,407 persons in 2001, whose employment relationship 
had ended within the questioning period.13  
With the “WSI Survey on Company Personnel Policies” in 2003, information was 
gathered about the application of the Employment Protection Act. It was based on a 
representative survey of persons with personnel responsibility in 2,000 private 
companies.14 The table below differentiates according to company size where 
possible. For this purpose, we divided the companies into size classes and in 
keeping with the definition of the European Union used the following designations: 
“Small and medium-sized enterprises” (SME) for all operational units/companies15 
with up to 249 employees; broken down into: “smallest companies“ for companies 
with up to 10 employees, “small companies“ for companies with 11 to 49 employees 
and “medium companies“ for those with 50 to 249 employees. “Large companies“ in 
contrast are those with more than 250 employees.16
 
12  The IAB-Betriebspanel data used here excludes public sector data because personnel policy in this area is 
atypical. As such, all Betriebspanel data refers only to the private economy. 
13 The survey period lay between September 1999 und November 2000. A prerequisite was the respondent had 
terminated an employment contract during this period, either through dismissal or because they had quit, 
through dissolution of the employment contract or through expiry of a fixed term contract. The results of this 
survey were published in (Bielenski et al. 2002; Bielenski et al. 2003; Bothfeld/Ullmann 2004, 
Schneider/Ullmann 2006). 
14 The survey instrument used was the computer-supported telephone interview. This instrument guarantees 
high quality data, partly because fewer questions are left unanswered. The questions especially addressed the 
company’s behaviour in relation to hiring and dismissals over a 5-year period (Summer 1998 to the summer of 
2003). The results of this study were published in Pfarr et al. (2005). 
15 These two terms have different meanings in legal discussion and their use here is not equivalent to their use 
in legal dogma, since the empirical basis of the data typically relates to operational units and not to 
companies. 
16 Since no turnover data was available, we abstained from classifying the companies, according to EU 
definition, using this criteria. However, research by the Institute for Small and Medium Size Enterprises, Bonn 
(IFM) shows that the additional criteria of turnover does not significantly alter classification according to size 
(Institut für Mittelstandsforschung 2006). 
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3.1 The relevance of termination of the employment relationship in the German 
employment system  
The exact number of employment relationship that are terminated annually is not 
documented in official statistics and can therefore only be approximately 
reconstructed using supporting indicators. For example, the Federal Employment 
Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit) counts around 7 million entries to and departures 
from unemployment per annum,17 whereby less than half of these (2006: 43 %) were 
previously in active employment18. From the WSI Survey on the Termination of 
Employment Relationships (2001), it can be taken that of all persons whose 
employment relationships ended within the survey period approximately half 
registered as unemployed (Pfarr et al 2005: 45). If only half of the terminations were 
recorded through registration as unemployed and approximately half of the new 
unemployment registrations come from paid employment, then the total number of 
terminated employment relationships is probably in the order of 7 million per annum. 
Choice of Termination Form  
Employer-initiated termination competes with other personnel policy instruments and 
accounts for approximately a third of regular employment contract terminations. 
Calculations from various data sources estimate the employer share of terminations 
at 32% (Bielenski et al. 2003). The SOEP 2003 attributes a share of only 26% to 
employer dismissals, or 36% with the inclusion of terminations associated with the 
cessation of business (on the problems of the individual data sources, cf. Bielenski 
and Ullmann 2005). This demonstrates relative stability when compared to the results 
of a representative survey of around 2400 companies in the private economy in 
1987, in which the share of employer-initiated terminations lay at 27% (Büchtemann 
1990: 402). Nevertheless the share of employer terminations and own termination 
correlates with the economic situation, as shown in Tables 1a to 1d. While the 
German economy was doing well from 2000 to 2002, recession began in 2003 and 
continued until 2005. The share of employer-initiated terminations rose from 23% in 
2000 to 33% in 2003, before sinking once again (Table 1a). In contrast, the share of 
employee-initiated terminations dropped from 42% in the year 2000 to 26% in 2005 
(Table 1b). 
 
17 Bundesagentur für Arbeit (Federal Employment Office) (2006) The Labour Market in Figures, Status: 
December 2006, http://www.pub.arbeitsamt.de/hst/services/statistik/200612/iiia4/akt_dat_jzd.pdf. 
18    cf. Bundesagentur für Arbeit (2004). 
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During the same period, the number of unemployed increased by around a million 
persons. Apparently the inclination of employees to give up their jobs is lower in 
times of high unemployment than during times when labour is in higher demand. 
Worker’s reduced mobility during difficult economic times increases the significance 
of termination by the employer since the decline of departures of employees reduces 
the company’s flexibility. 
 
Tables 1a to 1 d: Share of personnel departures between 2000 and 2005 
according to the nature of termination (as % of all terminations)19
Table 1a: Employer Termination 
Employer 
Termination 
1 to 5 6 to 10 11 to 19 20 to 49 50 to 99 
100 to 
249 
>= 250 Total 
2000 30% 26% 29% 21% 23% 20% 15% 23% 
2001 36% 36% 32% 30% 24% 24% 13% 26% 
2002 40% 37% 31% 31% 32% 28% 14% 29% 
2003 47% 34% 37% 38% 34% 31% 18% 33% 
2004 46% 38% 39% 33% 31% 31% 15% 31% 
2005 48% 37% 34% 32% 28% 27% 18% 31% 
Source: IAB-Betriebspanel, excluding public services, weighted results.
 
Table 1b: Own Termination 
Own 
Termination 
1 to 5 6 to 10 11 to 19 20 to 49 50 to 99 
100 to 
249 
>= 250 Total 
2000 40% 44% 43% 49% 49% 44% 34% 42% 
2001 30% 35% 45% 41% 49% 40% 35% 38% 
2002 27% 33% 40% 38% 34% 33% 29% 33% 
2003 25% 41% 36% 29% 30% 24% 24% 29% 
2004 25% 32% 31% 31% 30% 22% 22% 27% 
2005 22% 33% 30% 29% 27% 25% 22% 26% 
Source: IAB-Betriebspanel, excluding public services, weighted results.
 
                                            
19 Terminations due to the completion of training, retirement and “other causes” (i.e. termination due to 
occupational disability and relocation to other companies) are not shown here. 
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Table 1c: End of Fixed Term Contracts 
Fixed Term 1 to 5 6 to 10 11 to 19 20 to 
49 
50 to 
99 
100 to 
249 
>= 250 Total 
2000 5% 4% 3% 7% 9% 13% 19% 10% 
2001 5% 6% 4% 6% 9% 16% 22% 11% 
2002 5% 3% 4% 9% 12% 16% 26% 13% 
2003 5% 5% 3% 11% 17% 17% 21% 12% 
2004 4% 5% 7% 14% 11% 22% 26% 15% 
2005 3% 5% 9% 14% 18% 23% 21% 14% 
Source: IAB-Betriebspanel, excluding public services, weighted results.
 
Table 1d: Dissolution 
Dissolution 1 to 5 6 to 10 11 to 19 20 to 49 50 to 99 100 to 
249 
>= 250 total 
2000 4% 5% 4% 4% 4% 6% 9% 6% 
2001 6% 3% 5% 4% 5% 5% 8% 6% 
2002 6% 6% 4% 4% 6% 7% 9% 6% 
2003 4% 4% 6% 5% 6% 9% 10% 7% 
2004 4% 6% 4% 4% 5% 6% 10% 6% 
2005 4% 5% 2% 5% 8% 6% 11% 7% 
Source: IAB-Betriebspanel, excluding public services, weighted results.
 
These results require differentiated interpretation on another count. Considering the 
nature of termination according to company size class shows that employee-initiated 
terminations are of much greater significance in small companies than in large 
companies with more than 250 employees. In contrast, large companies use the 
option of fixed-term employment to a much greater extent than the small company 
classes with up to 50 employees. These size related differences are contingent on at 
least two factors. Firstly, the staff turnover in the smallest companies is markedly 
higher than in large companies (Bielenski et al. 2003; Erlinghagen/Knuth 2003), so 
that the need for employer-initiated termination is much more probable in large 
companies simply as side-effect of size. At the same time, the smallest companies 
have access to fewer alternative instruments for reducing personnel, whether 
because they lack the knowledge and practice in relation to labour and social 
legislation, or because their internal flexibility is limited. For example, in 2003 only 
2.1% of all companies engaged temporary workers to the key date 30.6. compared to 
36% of companies with more than 250 employees.20 The use of fixed-term 
                                            
20 Source: IAB-Betriebspanel 2003, excluding public services; own calculations, weighted results. 
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employment, also increases with company size (Düll/Ellguth 1999: 173; see also 
Hagen/Bookmann 2002). At the same time, large companies use dissolution 
contracts more often than smaller companies. We don’t know the content of these 
contracts. There is no data available, but it can be assumed that large companies 
often agree to severance payments in dissolution contracts. Nevertheless, the data 
shows that companies don’t use dissolution contracts more frequently in 
economically difficult times. Apparently they manage to dismiss the employees they 
no longer require. 
Termination Initiative 
Die relative significance of employer-initiated termination doesn’t support any 
conclusion about the concrete events involved in the termination. In fact, it could be 
part of company strategy to call on employees to quit themselves when necessary or 
to offer a dissolution agreement. In that case, not the formal execution of termination 
but rather the initiative to end the employment relationship would be crucial. The 
results of the WSI Survey on the Termination of Employment Relationships (2001) 
show that more terminations were initiated by employers (44%), than by employees 
(32%; Table 2). If one considers the form of termination by initiative, it becomes 
apparent that the employers who want to separate from employees rely on employer-
initiated termination in only 58% of cases and let fixed-term contracts expire in 32% 
of cases. At 8.5%, dissolution agreements are relatively infrequent in employer-
initiated terminations21, and the situation where employees quit in response to the 
employer’s initiative was also found to be rare, with a share of only 2%.  
Among employees, the share of self-initiated terminations (49%) is also greater than 
the share of own terminations (39%). In most cases (75%) employees who wanted to 
end their employment relationships decided to quit however, some managed to 
conclude a dissolution agreement (11%), with their employer and only a few (6%) 
had their employer dismiss them. 
 
21 In this analysis no distinction was made between whether the agreement was made out of court or on the 
basis of a compromise suggested by the Labour Court. 
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Table 2: Initiative and form of termination during the period 9/1999-11/2000  
(in % of respondents) 
Proportion: by formal type of termination (Row percentages)  
Total 
 
Termination by 
Employer 
Termination by 
Employee 
Dissolution Fixed Term 
Formal nature 
of termination 
100 
(2394) 
 32 (758) 39 (930) 10 (242) 20 (464) 
Employer 
Initiative  
44.0 
(1178) 
10
0 
57.5 (605) 1.8 (19) 8.5 (90) 32.2 (339) 
Employee 
Initiative 
49.2 
(1053) 
10
0 
6.2 (73) 75.1 (885) 10.8 (127) 7.9 (93) 
Mutual Initiative  
6.8 (163) 
10
0 
49 (80) 16 (26) 15.3 (25) 19.6 (32) 
Source: WS Survey on Employment Relationships 2001; own calculation. Weighted share in percent, unweighted no. of cases 
in brackets; Details of mean deviation are available on request. 
 
Around 7% of all terminations resulted from the joint initiative of the employee and 
employer. In half of all cases the employer issued the termination; dissolution 
agreements were only seldom negotiated (15.3%). 
During the survey period, employees quitting on their own initiative represented the 
most frequent case (37% of all terminations); the terminations initiated and issued by 
employers followed in second place with 25%. The third largest group was formed by 
fixed term contracts concluded on the employer’s initiative (14%). As such, employer-
initiated termination stands in competition to the instrument of fixed-term contracts 
when it comes to the adjustment of personnel resources, but also to finding a 
common solution with the employee. In view of the high share of terminations by 
employees, it should be considered that the positive labour market development 
during the survey period (Autumn 1999 to Autumn 2000) had a positive influence on 
the number of employee-initiated terminations. In contrast, an increase in employer-
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initiated terminations is to be expected during times of increasing unemployment (cf. 
Table 1a). 
3.2 The application of employment protection legislation in company practice 
Section 2.3 presented the spectrum of theoretical options for action that companies 
have at their disposal to reduce their personnel. In the previous section, it was shown 
that employer-initiated terminations represent only a small part of the total 
terminations. In this section, we will illuminate the individual stages of action in an 
employer-initiated termination and attempt to illustrate their relevance in practice 
using available empirical material. 
Inquiry into legitimacy and the term of notice 
Minimum employment protection22 and the terms of notice of termination are 
regulated in the German Civil Code (BGB), which applies to all companies. The 
statutory term of notice of termination for employers depends on the employee’s 
tenure and is first set at over 6 months for tenure of more than 15 years. Aside from 
this, a probationary period of up to six months can be agreed to, within which the 
employment relationship can be terminated with two weeks notice (Section 622 III 
BGB). However, the statutory terms of notice are fully subject to collective wage 
agreements so that they can be lengthened or shortened by collective regulations. 
A “special dismissal protection” that precludes the statutory notice of termination can 
be agreed to in collective wage agreements. This is usually coupled with the 
achievement of a specific age and duration of tenure in the company (WSI 2003).23  
Special legislation prohibits issuing notice of termination to pregnant women, mothers 
for 4 month after giving birth and employees on parental leave, and to members of 
the works council, youth trainee representatives and disabled persons.24 However, 
 
22 According to the jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG), the general clauses of civil law 
(Section 242 of the German Civil Code (BGB) – In good faith, and § 138 – Immoral Transactions) provide the 
basis for minimum protection from arbitrary dismissal (Federal Constitutional Court judgement of 27.01.1998, 
Neue Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht, Issue 9, 1998, p.470).
23 According to the jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court, should continued engagement be 
absolutely impossible, e.g. because the entire company closes, employees under special dismissal protection 
can also be dismissed, though with long terms of notice, cf. Federal Labour Court (BAG) judgement of 
06.10.2005, 2 AZR 362/04, published under: www.bundesarbeitsgericht.de. 
24 The provisions for special dismissal protection, among other things, regulated by Section 15 of the 
Employment Protection Act (KSchG), for pregnant women and mothers for the first four months following birth 
by Section 9 of the Maternity Protection Act (MuSchG), for employees on parental leave and 8 prior to giving 
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this employment protection is not absolute since the German Civil Code (BGB) 
provides employers with the right to dismiss any employee without notice “on 
important grounds” (Section 626 BGB). Government authorisation must be obtained 
for the dismissal of persons whose employment is covered by special legislation 
prohibiting termination (for persons with disability: Sections 85 ff. of the German 
Social Code (SGB IX)). This authorisation can also be granted for the regular 
dismissal of a pregnant woman or young mother during the four-month period 
following giving birth if the dismissal has nothing to do with her condition or situation 
(Section 9, Subsection 3 of the Maternity Protection Act (MuSchG)).  
Little is known about the application of these special regulations, the suspension of 
the special regulations prohibiting dismissal or the number of dismissals issued 
without notice. The survey results show that the terms of notice are observed in the 
overwhelming majority of cases: in 83% of cases of employee-initiated termination 
and in 85% of cases of employer-initiated termination.25 Whether the non-observance 
of the terms of notice is due to failure to comply with the statutory regulations or 
justified termination without notice is unknown. But surely dismissal without notice 
represents only a small share of all terminations. There is an additional regulation for 
collective redundancies that requires notification of the Federal Employment Agency 
(Agentur für Arbeit).26 The Agentur für Arbeit can withhold agreement to the planned 
date of the dismissals and in doing so delay them by one, or in individual cases by 
two months.  
In specific cases of multiple dismissals by companies with more than 20 employees, 
a social plan must be compiled in cooperation with the works council, given that the 
company has one.27 The survey results show however, that dismissals seldom occur 
within the framework of a social plan: Although 44% of those made redundant 
 
birth, by Section 18 of the Child Support Payment and the Parental Leave Act (BerzGG), i.e. since 01.01.2007 
by section 18 of the Federal Parental Benefit and Parental. Leave Act (BEEG).
25 Source: WSI Survey on the Termination of Employment Relationships (2001); own calculation, weighted 
results. 
26 Section 17 of the Employment Protection Act (KSchG) demands notification of dismissals before the 
employees are issued with notice of dismissal if, within a period of 30 days, a company with between 20 und 
60 employees intends to dismiss 5 of them, a company with between 60 and 500 employees intends to 
dismiss 10 percent or more than 25 employees, or when companies with at least 500 employees intends to 
dismiss at least 30 of them on urgent operational grounds.
27 One case where this is required is changes to a company that involve only the dismissal of staff. Section 112a 
of the Works Constitution Act (BetrVG) also sets thresholds beyond which the formulation of a social plan is 
obligatory. These are more generous than the thresholds defined for the obligatory notification of dismissals 
acc. to Section 17 of the KSchG. Here, companies with 55 employees, of whom 6 are to be dismissed, must 
notify the Federal Employment Agency, but they are first required to formulate a social plan when 11 
employees are to be dismissed. The obligation to create a social plan does not apply to companies that have 
been established for less than four years.
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through employer-initiated termination stated that other employees were also 
dismissed, only 8% indicated that there had been a social plan (cf. also Bielenski et 
al. 2003: 88).28
Justification of termination on operational grounds according to the 
Employment Protection Act (KSchG) 
According to the KSchG, the company must provide the employee with grounds for 
their dismissal. Especially termination on operative grounds is the subject of 
discussion about the anti-employment nature of dismissal protection. Conditional to 
carrying out dismissal on operative grounds is that “urgent operational requirements”, 
which may result from internal or external circumstances, lead to the loss of one or 
more positions. The court can only investigate whether the underlying entrepreneurial 
decision was arbitrary. Once it has been determined which positions have been lost, 
a social selection must be made between all employees in equivalent positions. It is 
permitted for preference to be shown to those on whose performance the company 
relies. 
The WSI Survey on the Termination of Employment Relationships (2001) showed 
that around two thirds (67%) of terminations were justified using operational grounds, 
only 15% were conduct or person-related and 18% could not be clearly classified29.  
The relationship had reversed since previous research: According to a survey by the 
Max Planck Institute in 1980, the share of terminations on operational grounds 
accounted for a good third, while two thirds were attributed to conduct and person 
related grounds. (Falke et al. 1981). This could be due to the more favourable 
economic situation at that time. However, it is also possible that operational grounds 
are being pushed to the forefront today because conduct and person related 
dismissals can be more difficult to ground (on this subject, cf. also Jahn/Walwei 
2005). Data from the KÜPRAX research project shows that terminations on 
operational grounds stand up in court more often than conduct related terminations. 
Employers lose cases based on conduct related grounds significantly more often 
 
28 However this provides no indication of how many dismissals are carried out each year within the context of a 
social plan. Firstly, the employees are not always well informed – around 14% of respondents stated that they 
didn’t know whether a social plan had been concluded - and above all, the information relates to a survey 
period of 15 months (September 1999 to November 2000) so that an annual value for the year 2000 cannot be 
calculated.
29 Of dismissals against which an appealed was lodged before the Labour Court in 2003, 56% were due to 
urgent operational grounds (LAG: 44%), 32 % were conduct related (LAG: 44%) and 7 % were person related 
(LAG: 12%), cf. {{Höland et al., 2007: 282, 286}}  
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than those based on operational grounds: In judgements related to dismissals on 
operational grounds, the dismissal was found to be invalid in the first instance in 55 
% of the cases (State Labour Court (LAG): 46%), and in conduct related dismissals, 
in 68 % of cases (LAG: 55%) (Höland et al. 2007: 144 f.) 
The WSI Survey of Personnel Policies showed that a third (33%) of all respondent 
companies had gained experience with dismissal on operational grounds during the 
previous five-year period (1998 – 2003)30. 
Questioned about the greatest problem that the company had faced with dismissals 
on operational grounds, almost a quarter (24%) of the companies stated that they 
had experienced no problems – although “no problems” was not one of the optional 
answers provided. A quarter (27%) of the companies had difficulty in presenting the 
operational grounds, a further quarter (24%) mentioned the loss of key performers 
and 9% cited conducting the social selection as a problem. Overall, no differences 
could be identified between the company size classes – with one exception: 
Companies with up to 19 employees stated more frequently that they had 
experienced no problems with dismissals on operational grounds (cf. Pfarr et al 2005: 
56). In court proceedings, social selection also appeared to lack the importance 
ascribed to it in the literature: Only 8% of all dismissals on operative grounds were 
deemed invalid by the Labour Court or Regional Labour Court due to deficient social 
selections (Höland et al. 2007: 123). 
Works Council involvement in terminations 
If a works council exists, it must be heard before the notice of dismissal is issued; this 
means that it must be informed about the person to be dismissed and the grounds for 
dismissal. If the works council has reservations, it can object to the dismissal within a 
week and in doing so must provide grounds for the objection. However, the objection 
is only legally relevant if legal action is initiated since then the employee has the right 
to continued employment until the proceedings have been concluded. 
According to calculations of the IAB-Betriebspanel, companies with a works council 
are in the minority: In 2004, only 13.5% of all companies with more than five 
employees had a works council31. Nevertheless, around half of all employees (in 
West Germany 53,5%, in East Germany 47%) work in companies with works 
 
30 WSI Survey on the Termination of Employment Relationships 2001; own calculation. 
31 Source: IAB-Betriebspanel 2004, weighted results. 
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councils. Qualitative research has revealed that there are various patterns of internal 
company cooperation between employers and the employee representatives and that 
some of the works councils function effectively as “co-managers” (Bradtke et al. 
2004) and the cooperation between the personnel managers and the works council is 
often judged to be good to very good (cf. de Santana 2005: 375). 
In the WSI Survey on the Termination of Employment Relationships (2001), most 
(60%) dismissed employees from companies with an active works council stated that 
it had been informed of the dismissal. This represents a quarter of all employer-
initiated terminations (25.7%).32 Of those works councils that were informed, only one 
in ten objected to the dismissal. It came to legal action in half of the cases where the 
works council had placed an objection.33 The results of the KÜPRAX project showed 
that in the cases in which a works council was present, they expressed misgivings 
about the dismissals, i.e. objected to them in 35% of cases before labour courts and 
in 38% of cases before regional labour courts respectively (Höland et al. 2007: 103). 
There are indications that as control mechanisms, works councils also have a 
positive effect on the correct application of labour law: The presence of a works 
council significantly increases the probability that companies state that they have an 
overview of labour legislation (Pfarr et. al. 2005: 19). This appears not to be 
implausible since the works council is available as an additional source of information 
about labour law and can advise of legal options and limits where appropriate. At the 
same time, its existence alone is cause for compliance with applicable legislation, 
which results in the minimisation of conflict.  
Knowledge of the law within companies 
While the German Civil Code (BGB) and special dismissal protection apply to all 
companies and guarantee a minimum of protection, the scope of application of the 
Employment Protection Act is limited and applied only to companies with more than 5 
employees until 31.12.2003.34 Since the 1.1.2004, the Act applies to all new 
 
32 In 56.4% of all dismissals, there was no works council; in 12.7% of cases, the respondent didn’t know whether 
the works council had been informed and in only 4,3% of cases, the respondent reported that the works 
council had not been informed (WSI Survey on the Termination of Employment Relationships (2001), own 
calculation; weighted results). 
33  Due to the small number of cases, this data could only be evaluated as an indication and not as evidence. The 
number of cases that appealed amounted to N=19. 
34 According to Section 23 Subsection 1 of the Employment Protection Act (KSchG), the following employment 
limits apply: Part-time employees working up to 20 hours count as only a half, and part-time employees with 
up to 30 hours count only as ¾. 
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engagements in companies with more than 10 employees.35 In addition, the 
Employment Protection Act is only applicable to employment relationships that have 
existed for longer than six months. 
In the WSI Survey on Company Personnel Policies (2003) companies were asked 
about their problems with labour law. Only about a third of companies (31%) 
answered affirmatively to the question of whether there were problems in maintaining 
an overview of labour law (Pfarr et al 2005: 13). That two thirds of the companies 
reported that they have no problems with labour law does not mean however, that 
they know and apply the law; it is equally possible that they don’t know it and don’t 
apply it and therefore have never had a problem36. An indication of this situation is 
provided by the finding that particularly many of the smallest companies have no 
exact knowledge of the law since just under two thirds (64%) of the respondents from 
companies with five or less employees didn’t know that the Employment Protection 
Act (KSchG) did not apply to them (for detailed information, cf. Pfarr et al. 2005: 27 
ff.). A multi-variant analysis found that alongside the existence of a Personnel 
Department, a works council and long-term personnel planning, the economic 
situation has a highly significant influence on whether companies stated that they 
were unable to understand labour law (Pfarr et al 2005: 20 f.). It follows that a 
systematic examination of the law, whether for reasons of long-term planning or 
internal expert knowledge (Works council or Personnel Department), increases the 
chance that an employer does not find labour law too complex. On the contrary, the 
fact that the economic situation has a highly significant influence indicates that the 
respondents interpreted the problem of understanding of labour law as a problem 
with the labour law. Finally, only qualitative research can deliver information about 
the way those responsible for personnel deal with labour law. The realm of personal 
motivation for action cannot be adequately described through quantitative data, 
which is why these results can only be considered first indices. 
Another interesting question is that of how companies procure their information.  
 
35  Cf.. Federal Gazette, Part I 2003, No. 67, 30.12.2003, p. 3002.
36 A Bertelsmann Foundation project (Öwar) discovered that a large proportion of the population estimates its 
competence in labour law as good, but that the real knowledge of labour law is poor. The project report can be 
found here:   
http://www.arbvg.de/downloads/Empirische%20Studie%20zur%20Oeffentlichen%20Wahrnehmung%20des%
20Arbeitsrechts.pdf 
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Table 3: Knowledge and assessment of labour rights (in %) 
By Company Size Categories 
 Total 
1-5 6-9 10-19 20-99 100-499 500 +
Does the company have the 
support of a Personnel 
17,9 (889) 9,2 20,4 33,3 58,3 93,1 100,0
Which external services are used for consultation on labour law? 
Lawyer 47.7 (1143) 39.8 60.4 62.0 77.5 80.0 50.0 
Accountant 75.3 (1281) 76.8 78.7 71.1 69.5 41.4 25.0 
Chamber 43.5 ( 821) 42.3 52.8 44.3 42.4 31.0 25.0 
Employers Association 21.8 ( 799) 16.0 23.9 35.0 45.0 69.0 75.0 
Federal Employment Office 26.4 ( 670) 22.4 32.5 34.4 39.7 48.3 50.0 
Other services 12.7 ( 400) 10.1 14.5 21.7 18.5 31.0 50.0 
Did the company refrain from 
dismissal? 
8.9 ( 435) 
/21.2* (408) 
3.7 12.8 18.9 32.7 37.9 50.0 
Source: WSI Survey on Company Personnel Policies (2003), own calculations; weighted shares in percent; Unweighted no. of 
cases in brackets;  
* Excluding small companies that are exempted from the Labour Protection Act. 
 
If two thirds of the smallest companies do not know that the Employment Protection 
Act does not apply to them, this is presumably also partly due to the available 
sources of information. Indeed, Personnel Departments are seldom found in the 
smallest companies. An average of 18% of all companies have access to a 
Personnel Department either within in their own company or in a parent company; 
over half the companies with over 20 employees and almost all companies with more 
than 100 employees have this infrastructure (cf. also the findings of (Alewell 2002). 
The question of whether and as the case may be, which positions in the company 
take advantage of an external consultation on labour law resulted in a very different 
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pattern of information procurement for the various company size classes. Smaller 
companies frequently received their advice on labour law from the accountant, in 
larger companies this advice was more likely to come from a lawyer. Small 
companies tend to consult the Chamber of Commerce while large companies are 
more likely to consult employer associations. 
The Federal Employment Agency provided advice to approximately a quarter of all 
the companies (26%), whereby the share of large companies is distinctly higher here. 
This is possibly due to the regulations for mass dismissal or the implementation of 
labour market policy instruments. 
Alternatively, knowledge of labour law also comes from experience with personnel 
policy instruments. Interestingly however, this experience does not lead to labour law 
being considered clearer. Rather, awareness of the existence and complexity of 
labour law first emerges with its application. It therefore appears plausible that 
companies that have experience with terminations on operational grounds and fixed-
term or temporary personnel more often reported that it was difficult to gain an 
overview of employment legislation (Pfarr et al. 2005: 18 f.). A systematic 
examination of the law, independent of an instance of conflict would presumably lead 
to a positive approach to the law: this is supported by the finding that those 
companies that responded having access to internal expert knowledge or maintaining 
a long-term personnel plan less frequently found the law too complex (ibid.: 19). 
Refrainment from Dismissal  
Ultimately the question is posed of whether the feeling of legal uncertainty – arising 
from concrete experience – leads to reluctance in dismissals. In the WSI Survey on 
Company Personnel Policies (2003), those responsible for personnel were therefore 
asked retrospectively about their actual behaviour, namely the refrainment from 
dismissal and asked about the continuation of those affected in their positions.37 
Around 9% of all companies reported to have considered dismissal at least once but 
then having refrained from doing so. In the smallest companies (with up to five 
employees), in which dismissals occur most frequently, this occurred in only 4% of 
cases. If the smallest companies are excluded from the population, the average lies 
at 21%. Although in all, only few employees were affected38 and not every 
 
37 The wording of the question was: “Have there been cases, since the beginning of 1998, in which dismissal 
was considered but not carried out due to fear that the dismissal could not be enforced?“ 
38 On average, there were three cases where dismissal was abstained from during the five-year period from 
1998 to 2003 in companies with 20-99 employees, five cases in companies with 100-499 employees and 14 in 
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refrainment from dismissal led to permanent continued employment: Nevertheless 
78% of respondents (all company sizes) reported that it resulted in continued 
employment in least in some cases39, 21% reported that the employees (among 
others) had quit themselves, and 12% reported that they had sometimes concluded 
dissolution agreements.  
In respect to company size, it is conspicuous that the occurrence of employee-
initiated termination in such cases was, with 35%, clearly of above-average 
frequency in small companies with between six and nine employees and the share of 
companies that concluded dissolution agreements clearly increased with company 
size.40
3.3 Cost of Terminations 
According to the principles of the German Employment protection Act, companies 
incur no costs through lawful dismissals – aside from the requirement that they 
observe the term of notice. However literature and the press advance the idea that 
employers must regularly “buy themselves free” of employees because the 
dissolution of the employment relationship is otherwise hardly possible due to the 
complexity of the law and legal practice. 
Termination Payments  
The WSI Survey on the Termination of Employment Relationships (2001) found that 
termination payments were seldom paid, on average in only 10% of all terminations 
(Table 4). In the case of dissolution agreements, through which every tenth 
employment relationship was terminated, a severance payment was made in one 
third of the cases (n=62). Severance pay was provided in only 15% (n=133) of 
employer-initiated terminations. Overall, terminations in small and medium sized 
companies are much less often accompanied by severance payments than those in 
large companies. Only 5% of employees from companies with less than ten 
 
companies with 500 employees (WSI – Survey on Company Personnel Policy 2003, own calculation; weighted 
results). The reasons for not carrying out these dismissals could not be determined for methodological 
reasons.
39 Since it was only asked “what happened to the employees concerned”, multiple answers were possible where 
several dismissals had been avoided so that an exact assignment of outcomes to the individual cases was not 
possible.  
40 Greater differentiation was not possible due to the small number of cases (For further findings, see Pfarr et al. 
2005, p. 82 ff.).
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employees received severance pay following dismissal, while in large companies 
severance pay was received by 38% of dismissed employees. 
Table 4: Frequency of severance payments by company size (in %) 
 Total 1-9 10-49 50-199 200-499 500 + 
All terminations  9,8 (223) 3,1 9,4 7,3 15,2 25,4 
Employer dismissals 
only 
14,8 (133) 5,2 15,4 19,2 29,9 38,0 
Source: WSI Survey on the Termination of Employment Relationships, own calculations, weighted share 
values in percent; unweighted no. of cases in brackets.  
 
The conclusion of a social plan or legal action against the dismissal increases the 
probability that a termination payment will be made but there is no guarantee: a 
termination payment was received in 75% of cases where dismissal occurred within 
the context of a social plan. Of those persons who took legal action against their 
dismissal, 47% received severance pay (cf. Pfarr et al. 2005: 72; for termination 
payments by labour court action proceedings, see also Höland et al. 2007: 154 ff).  
In addition, broader analyses show that tenure is the most important condition for 
determining whether a termination payment is made at all: Termination pay is almost 
never paid in cases of dismissal following a tenure of less than two years and only 
after tenure of 20 years does every second dismissed employee receive a 
termination payment (Bothfeld/Ullmann 2004). Surprisingly, age plays no role: 
although more older employees receive termination payments, the decisive criteria is 
the length of tenure and not the age itself (Schneider/Ullmann 2006: 16, 20). In 
determining the sum of the termination payment in cases where the parties amicably 
agree to terminate the employment relationship in exchange for severance pay, the 
courts sometimes apply the so-called “rule of thumb“ according to which half a 
month’s salary is paid for each year of tenure.41 However, in addition to the main 
criteria, company tenure, the courts also take the action’s prospects of success and 
the company’s economic situation into consideration in formulating their suggestion 
(Höland et al. 2007: 158). The nature of termination also plays a role: Compensation 
                                            
41 The so-called rule of thumb has been adopted in Section 1a of the new Employment Protection Act (KSchG). 
However, this section does not forbid compensation solutions in which higher or lower termination payments 
can be made. 
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for termination is most often paid in dismissals that are person related or due to 
operational requirements (Höland et al. 2007: 164). 
In a third (30%) of settlements fixed by the Labour Court and in half (55%) of those 
fixed by the Higher Labour Court, a “certificate of mutual release” was also accorded, 
which means that the parties agreed that the compromise satisfied all claims arising 
from the employment relationship, including any possible backpay. (Höland et al. 
2007: 154). Astonishingly, whether or not an action had been filed had no influence 
on the amount of the termination payment although, in the event of successful legal 
action, the employer runs the risk of having to pay backpay. On average, termination 
payments – whether they are settled in or out of court – are oriented on the 
previously mentioned Labour Court rule of thumb of a half month’s wages for each 
year of tenure (Pfarr et al. 2005: 74), and on average, higher termination payments 
are only achieved before the Higher Labour Court, (Höland et al. 2007: 160). 
Frequency of legal action  
The results of the two WSI surveys are the only sources based on current 
representative surveys and that allow a reliable calculation of the frequency of legal 
action. The last study in the context of which the frequency of legal action by 
dismissed employees was reliably calculated comes from 1978/1981 and found a 
frequency of 8% – in an, at that time, good economic situation (Falke et al. 1981). 
Other frequencies of legal action have been calculated recently but they are based 
on an unreliable data source (Jahn/Walwei 2003; Jahn/Schnabel 2003b; Bonin 2004; 
Jahn 2004). The – in contrast relatively reliable – results of the WSI Survey on 
Company Personnel Policies (2003)42 show that the overall rate of legal action lies at 
about 15% and increases with company size (Table 5). While in companies with over 
500 employees, according to those with personnel responsibility, legal action is taken 
against a good quarter of dismissals43, the rate was only 7% in companies with up to 
5 employees. 
 
42 The WSI Survey on the Termination of Employment Relationships (2001) found an appeal rate of 11%.
43  Here, it must be taken into consideration that the number of lawsuits in large companies over five years was 
often estimated and it can be expected that court proceedings, as a markedly negative event, is overestimated 
over a long period. 
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Table 5: Frequency of legal action by company size during the period 1998 to 
2003 (in percent) 
 Total 1 - 5 6 - 9 10 - 19 20 - 99 100-499 500+ 
Rate of legal 
action* (weighted) 
15 
(8490) 
7 
(66) 
13 
(78) 
13 
(195) 
23  
(687) 
24 
(1522) 
28 
(5942) 
Source: WSI Survey on Company Personnel Policies (2003). Weighted share values in percent; unweighted no. 
of cases in brackets. * defined as the share of complaints against employer-initiated dismissal. 
 
The low rate of legal action in the smallest companies possibly arises from the 
situation where the closer relationship between employer and employees holds the 
employee back from initiating action, and perhaps also because they hope to be 
reinstated should the economic situation improve. The reasons for dismissal on 
urgent operational grounds are possibly also more transparent for employees in 
small companies or the knowledge of a precarious financial situation in the smallest 
companies restrains the employees from legal action out of loyalty.  
If legal action is filed, the court investigates whether the legal requirements are 
satisfied. If neither the Employment Protection Act (KSchG) nor provisions for special 
dismissal protection are applicable, the court only decides whether the dismissal 
represents a breach of general clauses under civil law. The law court statistics make 
it clear that the possible costs incurred as a result of the duration of the proceedings 
(obligation to pay backpay) are small since two thirds of all proceedings are finalised, 
at the latest, within three months (25% after one month, a further 41% after 1-3 
months). Only 2% of cases take more than a year. In the great majority of cases, the 
proceedings are then also finalised: An appeal is lodged against only around 4% of 
cases.44 The data from the KÜPRAX project shows that the proceedings are shorter 
when the parties are not represented (Höland et al. 2007: 192). In addition, should 
the employer refuse to pay backpay, this must also be legally enforced. Specific 
expiry deadlines, which are defined in the employment contract or collective 
                                            
44  The Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment calculates statistics on the work of the labour 
courts each year and makes these available to the State Labour Courts via the responsible State Ministries. 
Publication of the results, including those of the individual states, takes place later in the Bundesarbeitsblatt. 
(cf. Statistics of labour court jurisdiction, summarised averages for the years 1999 to 2003. The rate of appeal 
relates to the year 2001; http://www.arbeitsgerichtsverband.de/Statistik%20ArbGe.htm, Accessed on 
15.11.2004.). 
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agreement, apply here. Winning the employment protection case alone does not 
create an entitlement to backpay (cf. on this subject Schier 2006). 
Results of the Proceedings 
The majority of Employment Protection cases before the Labour Court (65%) ended 
in a compromise (Höland et al. 2007: 139): In 1978, this share already lay at 60% 
(Falke et al 1981, p. 481). Only around 11% of the dismissal cases before the labour 
courts and approx. 30% of dismissal cases before the higher labour courts ended in 
a disputed judgement (Höland et al. 2007: 139). Not every court compromise is 
accompanied by termination payments. Only in approx. ¾ of all court compromises 
was, among other things, a severance payment agreed upon (Höland et al. 2007: 
160). The dismissed employee’s claim that the dismissal breached the law was 
upheld in only 6% of cases (Höland et al. 2007: ). In these cases, the employment 
relationship continued. It is unknown whether these employment relationships 
continued enduringly or whether they were terminated at the next possible 
opportunity. On the other hand, it is also possible to secure continuation of the 
employment relationship through a consent decree or a compromise. The KÜPRAX 
project researchers came to the conclusion that the employment relationship 
continued (at least in the first instance) in approximately 15% of all dismissal 
disputes, excluding those involving public servants, in 2003 (Höland et al. 2007: 204). 
4. Conclusion 
The action taken by companies is determined by a multitude of factors. Labour law is 
only one of them. Macroeconomic studies cannot show the complexity of company 
decisions or the interaction between the various factors of influence. There is no 
single “best personnel strategy” for all companies: a short-term personnel strategy 
that accepts conflict can be just as worthwhile as a long-term, amicable strategy. 
Therefore, the law does not prescribe a single, obligatory action. On the one hand, 
legislation allows various options for action; on the other, there are various ways of 
dealing with the law.  
Quantitative surveys show that termination by the employer accounts for only a third 
of all terminations – depending on the overall economic situation. These are usually 
implemented without conflict. Severance payments are rare. Most cases before the 
labour courts result in a compromise and the duration of labour court proceedings is 
exceptionally short. Continued employment following notice of termination occurs in 
only very few cases. Companies seldom shy away from issuing terminations. 
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Consequently, the overall picture indicates that companies incur few costs as a result 
of the Employment Protection Act. It is therefore unlikely that altering the 
Employment Protection Act would lead to the creation of new positions. On the other 
hand, the data makes it clear that companies have limited knowledge of the law. 
Above all, small companies rely on an accountant rather than a lawyer when it comes 
to problems with labour law regulations. In contrast, many of those who are 
responsible for personnel report having no problems with labour law. However, this is 
due to the fact that they don’t (have to) use it rather than that they have profound 
knowledge of the law.  
In all, it is clear that companies cannot implement German Labour Law 1:1, as 
assumed by neoclassical theory, because many of them lack the knowledge of 
labour law. In addition, labour law may not even be required to solve many problems. 
It follows then, that all economic models that present the law as an influential factor 
suffer the following flaw: They cannot model the company decision-making process 
and therefore don’t know what influence law has in the companies. As such, they 
portray only a picture of the written law and not how labour law is lived.  
In addition, the economic and regulatory perspectives focus on the negative effects 
of the Labour Protection Act. The positive effects associated with employment 
security, for example the employees’ willingness to acquire company-specific 
qualifications, the willingness to remain in a company long term and minimisation of 
the cost of proceedings through the establishment of binding regulations usually 
remain unconsidered in macroeconomic models. 
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